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This paper analyses the ‘root’ causes of complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) on the
basis of studies conducted in a UNU/WIDER project on social and economic causes of
CHEs; and identifies policies that appear relevant to the prevention of conflict.  The paper
regards horizontal inequality (i.e. inequality among groups, in contrast to vertical inequality
which measures inequality among individuals) as the fundamental source of organised
conflict.  Such horizontal inequality may have political, economic or social dimensions.  The
case studies indicate that CHEs occur where group identity coincides with horizontal
inequality that is consistent, and often widening, over a number of dimensions.  Preventative
policies need to be addressed towards correcting horizontal inequality along the relevant
dimensions.  Where conflicts are already underway, it is also necessary to introduce policies
to change the private incentives of those who carry it out towards alternative peaceful
occupations.  Preventative policies thus require inclusive government, politically,
economically and socially.  Such policies do not form part of the current political or
economic conditionality exercised by the international community, and may sometimes
contradict this conditionality.
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I. Introduction
Our aim in this project has been to identify the ‘root causes’ of complex humanitarian
emergencies. To attempt to answer this difficult question, we have adopted a multidimensional
approach encompassing theoretical considerations backed up by empirical evidence from 
political scientists, anthropologists, historians  and economists, together with  a number of
case studies of particular conflicts. This paper attempts to draw some conclusions from the
analysis presented, and to identify some policies that appear relevant to the prevention of
conflict derived from these conclusions. 
It is apparent from the case studies (presented in Volume 2), and also evidence published
elsewhere, that no simple generalisations are plausible. Cases include state instigated violence
combined with international economic sanctions (Iraq and Haiti); those where power-seeking
interacting with ethnicity  has played a key role (e.g. Burundi and Rwanda);  those where
power-seeking cliques (even gangs) with broadly homogeneous ethnicity have initiated and
perpetuated conflict leading to a situation of near anarchy (Somalia, Sierra Leone); to those
where deep class inequalities have constituted the underlying cause (Central America,
Cambodia). Moreover, there are countries which, until the conflict broke out, were middle
income countries (Iraq, El Salvador, Bosnia), and others among the poorest in the world
(Somalia, Uganda). In some countries, the conflict was preceded by a period of economic
growth (Rwanda, Iraq) while elsewhere conflict followed prolonged economic stagnation. 
The econometric evidence appears to point to some more definitive conclusions.  Using a data
set from 1980 to 1995,  Auvinen and Nafziger identify  some conditions that are likely to
increase country vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies - notably low incomes and low
growth in incomes and food output, high inequality, inflation, military expenditure and a
tradition of conflict. Yet while these do appear to be predisposing conditions, the small
amount of the variance explained by all these factors put together - from 10 -15% -  indicates
that we have by no means captured the whole story. Moreover,  the data covers just 1980-
1995. The data cannot capture the causal processes leading to those emergencies which broke
out in 1980  (nine out of the twenty four - Auvinen and Nafziger, table 2). Some reverseQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 3
 Auvinen and Nafziger test for causality and find that ‘the relationship is stronger from GDP growth
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to emergencies than vice-versa’.
causality is also present, as Auvinen and Nafziger indicate.  It is well established that large
2
scale conflict leads to decline in incomes and growth, and especially food production per
capita (see e.g. Stewart et al., 1997).
The combination of the case studies and econometric analysis thus help to identify some
predisposing conditions, but do not allow simple generalisations. This  itself is an important
conclusion. After this study it should not be possible to state - as many do - that conflict is
inevitable because of primordial ethnic divisions, nor that it is the outcome of
underdevelopment and that policies to combat low incomes and poverty will also
automatically reduce the risk of conflict. The lessons from this study are more complex: the
causes are to be found in the interactions of power-seeking with group identity and
inequalities. There are important policy implications, but not of the rather simple variety which
typically form part of international discourse. To elucidate these conclusions, this paper is
organised as follows:
 
Section II will briefly consider the definition of the topic, i.e. ‘Complex humanitarian
emergencies’ and its interpretation in the rest of the chapter. Section III  presents a simple
framework for understanding and analysing motives for conflict among groups  and groups,
with a particular focus on economic motivation. A major conclusion from this analysis is that
horizontal inequality forms a key element in understanding motives for group violence. 
Section IV  elucidates the distinction between this type of inequality (defined as horizontal)
and vertical inequality, which is the measure normally used to identify inequality in society.
Section V draws on the evidence in the case studies following the analysis of Section III to
assess the importance of the various elements in the major CHEs explored in the country
studies. Section VI puts forward policy conclusions.
II: Definitions of the topic
The topic appears not to need much attention to definitions. We are discussing situations inQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 4
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which physical fighting between people, typically inhabitants of the same country,  leads to a
huge amount of human suffering, associated with large numbers of deaths both from the
fighting and from indirect effects of the conflict on food supplies and health.  Hence in looking
for root causes we should investigate the fundamental causes of such fighting. There are two
ways to proceed from this starting point. One is to adopt a simple definition of conflict  and
investigate the causes of any war which leads to significant numbers of deaths, with a rather
arbitrary cut-off point, e.g. more than 1,000 in a year (Wallensteen’s definition of a civil war ). 
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But this could be argued to be unsatisfactory from two perspectives: first, there may be a
major difference in causality according to the size of the conflict which could be missed if all
are grouped together in this way. Secondly, there does not seem to be anything very
‘complex’ about this definition, though, of course, any situation leading to deaths of 1,000 or
more would be likely to have both complex causes and complex effects.
Vayrynen and Voutira adopt different approaches to the question of definition of CHEs .
Voutira follows Foucault’s strategy towards language and discourse  and searches for  a
definition of  a CHE by analysing the language and norms of the  international community and
seeking the hidden political agendas. With this approach complexity is seen to arise not from
the situation per se, but from the ‘changing nature of international responses, including the
proliferation and multiplicity of actors, interests and  political agendas which contribute to the
perception of crises as increasingly more ‘complex’ (Voutira, summary). As she shows
different agencies have adopted different definitions: probably the nearest to a standard
definition is that of the DHA which defines a complex humanitarian emergency as:
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or
considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict which
requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any
single agency and/or ongoing UN country programme (47  Session of the General
th
Assembly, 1994).[My italics]
Others have included a check list of ‘events’ associated with CHEs. For example, anQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 5
international Task Force  included the following elements: domestic or inter-state armed
conflict; long-lasting duration; forced migration; political or military constraints on logistics;
security risks for relief workers; requirements for high degrees of political will and negotiation;
necessity for peace-making or peace-keeping; and difficult ethical dilemmas (Mohonk Criteria
developed by a Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance).
If CHEs are defined, as they evidently are by the international community, at least partly in
terms of the response of that community, then analysis of root causes has to investigate why
some crises lead to a strong international response while others are ignored. This would take
us into the geo-political significance of the country, the activities of the media etc.  Such
causal analysis would be a valid and important activity. But it is not the prime intention of this
study, which fundamentally aims to understand the causes of conflict-related human suffering.  
Hence we need a definition which includes all such conflicts, and not only those defined as
CHEs by the international community.
Vayrynen is concerned to identify  a comprehensive definition of  conflict-related suffering. He
defines a CHE as ‘ a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer
from war, disease, hunger and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters’ (p 16).
Such a definition appropriately describes a  humanitarian emergency, given the human
suffering arising from all four aspects, while the complexity of the emergency emanates from
the multidimensionality of the concept as well as ‘the politicised nature and persistence of the
crisis’ (p13).   Relatively ‘objective’ indicators of  the four elements - i.e. numbers killed
and/or wounded for war, numbers affected by diseases and/or high or rising mortality for the
incidence of disease, food availability and/or malnutrition for hunger, and numbers of refugees
or internally displaced persons for displacement - may then be used to signify the presence of a
CHE.  This leaves three key issues: whether a combination of all four factors must be present
to constitute a CHE, and if so whether there is any particular weight each element must take;
the ‘cut-off’ point for a situation to ‘count’ as a CHE; and how the elements are to be
measured.
Vayrynen answers the first question by arguing that all four elements must be present for QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 6
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emergencies’.
‘strong’ emergencies, but  ‘limited’ (or ‘partial’) emergencies include cases where either war
deaths and refugees are present but not hunger and disease, or hunger and disease but not war
deaths or refugees.  The latter type of ‘partial’ emergency basically characterises
underdevelopment and while it is obviously of central interest to those exploring how
underdevelopment can lead to human suffering, it is not the subject of this study which has
civil war as a central feature. Consequently, it is not explored further by him or others in the
study, except as a possible precondition or cause of a strong CHE.   Vayrynen’s  ‘cut-
off’`points are as follows: for wars, deaths of 2,000 or more for  1992-4; for displacement;
that the total of refugees and displaced people exceeded 385,000 in 1995; for  disease
countries are included when the child mortality rate in 1995 was 145 or over;  hunger is
defined as occurring where the proportion of underweight children exceeded 30% in 1992. In
each case, identification of the cut-off rate does not take into account whether the situation
had been improving or worsening despite the requirement that for a CHE the level of suffering
should depart ‘significantly from the prevailing standard’ (Vayrynen p19). 
Unavoidably, these cut-off points are arbitrary. Moreover, none of the indicators is
straightforward to assess in practice in conflict -ridden societies. Estimates of numbers killed
or wounded vary hugely, as shown for example even in the case of the high-tech and well-
monitored case of the Gulf war (see Alnasrawi) and internal displacement, in particular, can
rarely be more than guessed at;  data on child mortality  and nutrition are also notoriously
weak, especially in war zones, and are themselves strongly correlated. Child malnutrition is
typically  indicative of the presence of disease and lack of preventative health measures as
much or more than food availability. 
Nonetheless, Vayrynen’s approach undoubtedly  identifies the cases which would come up in
most people’s lists of the civil conflicts which cause major human suffering.   However, large
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CHEs, as defined by Vayrynen, usually develop from relatively small conflicts characterised by
war deaths alone and often without the presence of the other three elements in significant
quantities. Hence for analysis of root causes and preventative measures, it is important toQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 7
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5
weaker correlations with their indicators of hunger and disease.
include such cases as well.  For this reason the analysis below will adopt a simple definition of
conflict, with deaths from deliberate and organised physical violence as being the defining
characteristic. Usually,  the remaining trio of Vayrynen’s characteristics will also be present,
sometimes as cause, sometimes as effect and often both.  But in searching for root causes, the
5
analysis will focus on the causes of significant organised violence.
III.  Motivation, mobilisation and conflict: a framework  
The human motivation of the actors involved is clearly at the heart of any conflict situation. If
a conflict is to be avoided or stopped, this motivation must be understood, and the conditions
leading to a predisposition to conflict  reduced or eliminated. This section aims to sketch
elements that determine such motivation. While the focus is on economic motivation, other
factors (political, cultural) are also obviously of importance. They are incorporated in the
analysis that follows in a fundamental way since it is such factors (themselves influenced and
sometimes determined by economic factors) which decide the way people view themselves,
and are viewed  (i.e. the groups they form), as well as playing a large role in the distribution of
resources. In fact, it is rarely possible to disentangle political, cultural and economic elements,
as each is embedded in the other. 
The type of conflicts with which we are concerned are organised group conflicts: that is to say
they are not exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against others.
What is involved is group mobilisation, and we need to understand the underlying motivation
for such mobilisation. Groups are here defined as collections of people who identify with each
other, for certain purposes, as against those outside the group, normally also identifying some
other group with whom they are in conflict.  Group organisation may be quite informal, but it
exists, implying that there is some agreement (perhaps implicit) on purposes and activities
within the group. This means that normally there are those within any group instigating conflict
who lead or orchestrate the conflict, including constructing or enhancing the perception of
group identity in order to achieve group mobilisation;  and those who actively carry out theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 8
fighting, or give it some support - for shorthand, we shall call these two leaders and followers,
though there can be considerable overlap between the two categories . The violence is not, at
least purportedly, the objective, rather it is instrumental, used in order to achieve other ends.   
Usually, the declared objective is  political - to secure or sustain power - while power is wanted
for the advantages it offers, especially the possibilities of economic gains.  However, as Keen
points out, sometimes, especially as wars persist, political motivation may disappear or become
less important, and the wars are then pursued for the economic advantage conferred directly on
those involved, the possibilities of  looting etc. But even then conflicts remain predominantly
group activities.  The group element, and the fact that the conflicts are instrumental usually
with political objectives,  differentiate them from crime, though in the extreme case where
fighting parties have disintegrated into gangs whose efforts are devoted to maximising their
short run economic gains (see Keen on Liberia, for example), the distinction between crime and
conflict becomes blurred.
Accepting that groups are central, the question is why and how groups are mobilised. In order
to mobilise a group there must be some way that they are differentiated one from another.  The
case studies show a number of different ways groups have been differentiated and mobilised in
contemporary CHEs. In central Africa, ethnic identity is the major source of group definition
amd mobilisation; in Central America, group identification and organisation is along class lines; 
the case of the Iraq/Iran war, the Gulf War and subsequent sanctions, is largely of one nation
against the world, though of course the Kurds present an ethnically defined opposition  within
Iraq; in Northern Ireland, religion forms the differentiating principle; in Somalia, it is clans
(different lineages within broadly the same ethnic group). Another source of differentiation may
be regional location, which can, but does not always, coincide with ethnic or language divisions
- for example in Biafra, Eritrea and E.Pakistan (Bangladesh).  
The question of how groups are formed and when they become salient is  complex and
contested,  and cannot be treated adequately here. This issue, considered in relation to groups
defined by ethnicity, forms the central theme of the chapter by Alexander et al. The view
adopted in the present chapter is that group identity is ‘constructed’ by political leaders, who
find group cohesion and mobilisation a powerful mechanism in their competition for power andQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 9
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different ways, it is not any past” (Smith, 1991, pp357-358, quoted in Turton, 1997). 
resources, adopting a strategy of  ‘reworking of historical memories’ to engender group
identity.   Numerous examples presented in Alexander et al., as well as by Cohen, Turton and
others have shown how ‘ethnicity was used by political and intellectual elites prior to, or in the
course of , wars’ (Alexander et al. P 5).   Yet, as Turton points out, ‘neither the
constructedness nor the instrumentality of ethnicity [or other similar sources of identity which
are used to make groups cohere such as religion or class] can be explained unless we are
prepared to see it as an independent as well as a dependent variable in human affairs’ (Turton,
1997, p84; and see Smith, 1988).   Some shared circumstances are needed for group
construction - e.g. speaking the same language, sharing cultural traditions,  living in the same
place, or facing similar sources of hardship or exploitation. Past group formation, although
possibly constructed for political purposes at the time, also contributes to present differences.
Hence what was a dependent variable at one point in history can act as an independent variable
in contributing to current perceptions.      
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For the emergence of group conflict, a degree of similarity of circumstance among potential
members of a group is not by itself enough to bring about group mobilisation.  Several other
conditions must be present. Leaders must see the creation or enhancement of group identity as
helpful to the realisation of their political ambitions and work actively to achieve this, using a
variety of strategies, including education, propaganda etc. In many cases, it has been shown
that political leaders set out to create group consciousness in order to achieve a basis for
power.   Lonsdale points out that in Kenya “conflict between political elites for state (and hence
economic) power led to the emergence of ‘political tribalism’” (quote from Alexander et al,
p5).   Government policies, particularly towards education, frequently play a role by
discriminating in favour of some category and against others. The story of how  differences
between the Hutu and Tutsi were possibly created and certainly strongly enhanced by Colonial
and post-colonial governments is powerfully illustrated by the Burundi and Rwanda studies.   In
the Rwanda case, the interhammwe - the extremist leaders of the Hutu massacre of the Tutsi - 
deliberately and efficiently cultivated Hutu consciousness and fear of Tutsi for several years
before the disaster.  Some group mobilisation occurs as a defensive reaction,  in response toQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 10
discrimination against members of the group and attacks by others.  Often people don’t
recognise themselves as members of a group until this is ‘pointed out’ by outsiders. Differences
in actual underlying conditions  with respect to political control and  economic conditions,
facilitate the development of group identity and mobilisation. Without any differences in these
factors, group identification is likely to be weak and remain a cultural rather than political or
conflict-creating phenomenon.
The hypothesis is that in any society there are some differences in individuals’ circumstances -
including cultural, geographic, economic -  which provide the potential for the construction of
group identity as a source of political mobilisation. Political leaders, in government or outside,
may use this potential in their competition for power and resources,  in the course of which
they enhance group identification by reworking history, introducing new symbols etc.
However, cultural differences alone are not sufficient to bring about violent group mobilisation.
As Cohen points out “Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre
customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are differenct from their own.
But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across
ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning
the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both” (Cohen, 1974,
p94). 
Economic and political differentiation among groups is then of fundamental importance to
group mobilisation. This is the reason that relative position rather than absolute is more often
observed to be the underlying determinant of conflict (see Gurr; Nafziger Vol 2) . If  a whole
society is uniformly impoverished, there may be despair, but there is no motivation for group
organisation.  Even if political leaders hoped to use group mobilisation as a source of power,
they would find it difficult to secure sufficient response among followers without some
underlying economic differences among the people they hoped to mobilise.   Hence in general if
there is group conflict, we should expect sharp economic differences between conflicting
groups associated (or believed to be associated) with differences in political control.  Relevant
economic differences vary according to the nature of the economy (e.g. land may be irrelevant
in modern urban societies and employment relevant, but the converse could be true in rural-QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 11
based economies). Nonetheless, the absolute situation may also be relevant, since an absolute
deterioration in conditions may force attention onto the relative situation (e.g. when water
becomes a scarce resource people may fight over it, but not when its plentiful), while,
conversely, when incomes/resources are increasing generally people may mind less about their
relative position. The latter situation obtained in Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s and was argued
to be one reason why despite persistent relative inequality among tribal groups large scale
conflict did not result (see Klugman). But in some contexts, improvements in conditions, if
regarded as being unfairly shared can give rise to conflict, as in Nigeria in the late 1960s.
 Political power is an important instrument of economic power, setting the rules and
determining allocation of employment, of government economic and social investments and
incentives for private investment. In general one would expect that political power would be a
more compelling means of securing (or conversely being deprived of) economic resources, the
greater the role of government in the economy, and especially the more its discretionary power. 
It is plausible to argue that the role of the state relative to the market,  and the discretionary
decisions of government, may initially increase and are then likely to fall as development
proceeds. I.e. in very underdeveloped societies, government expenditure and employment is
low; this increases as does  government’ discretionary economic power as countries
industrialise; but in the later stages of industrialisation, the market tends to take a larger role
and government decisions are less discretionary and more rule-based. This would suggest that
struggles to control state power might be greatest in the middle stages of development. 
 
It should be noted that it is not necessarily the relatively deprived who instigate violence. The
privileged may do so, fearing loss of position. For example, the prospect of possible loss of
political power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with
the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power. Since the government has access to
an organised force (police/army) and to finance, state terrorism is sometimes an important
source of humanitarian emergencies. This was the case, for example, in most of the major
episodes of violence in Uganda, in Haiti, in Iraq’s suppression of the Kurds.   Holsti points out
that state violence is more often than not the initiating cause  in recent conflicts. QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 12
  ‘Symbolic systems’ are the values, myths, rituals and ceremonials which are used to organise and
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unite groups. (See Cohen, 1974).
In many societies organised violence persists at some level over very long periods. Given
underlying conditions that are conducive to conflict, there may be low-level conflict for certain
periods, and then periods of violence on a greater scale (civil war), sometimes culminating in
major catastrophes - CHEs.  The past history of violence then contributes to group
identification, animosities and mobilisation increasing the likelihood of future conflict. This was
shown statistically by Auvinen and Nafziger.  Such a long history of violence of fluctuating
strength appears to have occurred in many of the cases studied here - e.g. Somalia, Rwanda,
Burundi.   Hence a full understanding of causes must include an explanation both of the
underlying vulnerability to conflict and the particular triggers that led to a sharp escalation.
Preventative policies should address both the underlying causes and the ‘trigger’. The trigger
necessarily involves some change - including changes in relative deprivation or  the activities of
a particular political leader.
Dimensions of differentiation in the political, economic and social position of groups
Leaders often seize on, change and exaggerate, some cultural or religious differences - or
symbolic systems  - as a mechanism of group mobilisation. But it is suggested here that to
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make these symbolic systems ‘work’ effectively, it is necessary that there are parallel
differences in political and/or economic dimensions.  For simplification, we can categorise the
latter into  four  areas:  political participation; economic assets; incomes and employment; and
social aspects.  Each of these categories contains a number of elements. For example, political
participation can occur at the level of the cabinet, the bureaucracy, the army and so on; 
economic assets comprise land, livestock, machinery etc. 
The four categories and the main elements are presented in the table below, with a column for
each category.  Each of the four categories is important in itself, but most are also instrumental
for achieving others. For example, political power is both an ends and a means; control over
economic assets is primarily a means to secure income but it is also an end.   Clearly as noted
earlier, the relevance of a particular element  varies according to whether it forms an important
source of incomes or well-being in a particular society.  The allocation of housing, for example,QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 13
is generally more relevant in industrialised countries, while land is of huge importance where
agriculture accounts for most output and employment, but gets less important as development
proceeds. Water, as a productive resource,  can be very important in parts of the world where
rainwater is inadequate, as Swain points out. Access to minerals can be a source of great
wealth, and gaining such access an important source of conflict in countries with mineral
resources, as powerfully shown in the papers by Fairhead (this volume) and Reno (Volume 2). 
Table 1: Sources of differentiation among groups
Dimensions of Political Economic Employment Social access and
differentiation participation Assets and incomes situation
Elements of political land government education
categories parties
government human capital private health services
ministers,
senior
government communal ‘elite’ safe water
ministers, resources, employment
junior inc.water
army minerals ‘rents’  housing
 parliament privately skilled  unemployment 
owned
capital/credit
local govt. unskilled poverty
government infrastructure
respect for  security informal personal and
human rights against theft  sector household security
opportunities
A trigger event causing the initiation of conflict, or its escalation, may arise from a change inQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 14
relative access to any important resource in the table. This might occur because of some
political event (as in Afghanistan with the Russian invasion), or because of endogenous or
policy changes.  
Endogenous (or semi-endogenous) developments include growing population/land pressures;
environmental changes (e.g. desertification); or changes brought about by success or failure of
the development model resulting in changing absolute and relative access to employment and
incomes.
Policy changes may include: 
- Institutional: property rights; water regulations; commons access.
- Adjustment/stabilisation policies: terms of trade (devaluation; price deregulation);
employment and incomes; changes in state benefits..
- Political: changes in the distribution of state benefits for political reasons.
 External developments can also trigger changes in the relative access of different groups. Such
changes include market access; the international terms of trade; debt and interest payments; and
capital flows (including aid). Our studies give examples - the Iraq emergency was caused by a
combination of an aggressive state and a near complete cutoff from external markets, capital
flows and aid. In contrast, the Rwanda study suggests that the failed development model,
heavily aid-financed, contributed to the crisis. 
Main elements to be considered in an analysis of the causes of conflict
In exploring the causes of conflict we need to differentiate the following:
a. The reality or actual conditions of the situation of the various conflicting groups, absolutely
and relatively to others in the dimensions shown in Table 1.
b. The private benefits and costs of conflict to members of a group. Individual action is taken
partly (the extreme neo-classical position would argue entirely) as a result of a calculus of
individual or private costs and benefits of action. Of course, especially at times of high tension,QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 15
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group gains or losses also become a consideration. In some situations, people have been
observed to take action which is completely counter to their private interests - for example,
rioters have burned down factories in Sri Lanka where they themselves work, thereby
destroying their own employment.  The role of leaders (see below) is to see that group
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considerations override private ones, for which they may use propaganda, incentives and force.  
Individuals and groups may gain from conflict - e.g. by looting, use of forced labour, changes
in the terms of trade in their favour,  the creation of new economic opportunities, controlling
emergency aid. Keen has analysed such gains in the Sudan and elsewhere (Keen, 1994 and this
volume). However, many people lose from the physical violence, disrupted markets, reduced
state benefits, theft and looting  The private calculus of costs and benefits also depends on the
gains from avoiding conflict in terms of potential state benefits and economic rewards from
development in a peaceful environment. Hence the general prospects for economic
development and the extent to which the individual and the group to which (s)he belongs is
likely to share in development gains is an important consideration.  If these are low, the 
calculation is more likely to come out in favour of conflict.  The costs and benefits may be
differentiated by gender (and by group).
The cost/ benefit calculation may be different for leaders and followers and also between those
actively involved and the rest of the population.
c.  Leadership and  organisation of groups. The conflicts considered in this study  are
organised. There are typically 'leaders' (those who organise/employ armies etc.) and 'followers'
(who make up  the armies; provide food, finance etc.) For conflict, both leaders and followers
(whose interests can diverge) must be convinced of the advantage of fighting.  But their
calculus can be rather different. Leaders are generally seeking to form a government, control
resources, secure high office and so on. But leaders can do little without followers. However, if
the followers - ie those providing the manpower and other resources -  are strongly supportive
of conflict, against the views of their existing leaders,  new leaders may emerge.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 16
Any long run ‘solution’ must try and change the calculus of both leaders and followers with
respect to individual and group calculations. Individuals (leaders and followers) can be offered
‘bribes’ to stop fighting - e.g. power and status for leaders, finance and jobs for followers. But
unless the group differences that formed the underlying causes are also addressed, new leaders
and followers are likely to emerge, if not immediately in the medium term.  
d.. The perceptions of reality and of the private costs/benefits of conflict are decisive rather
than the actual situation. The actual situation is filtered by education, the media, political
argument and propaganda. All are more effective in influencing perceptions if there is
consonance between the picture of reality people are presented with by the various channels
and actual conditions. 
e. Constraints: Even with strong motives for conflict on the basis of individual and group
calculations, a strong state (or other authority) can prevent, eliminate or reduce conflict, while
a weak authority may not be able to constrain violence. Some of the conflicts in the former
Soviet Union can be seen as primarily due to the weakening of state authority and its ability to
suppress conflicts so that old conflicts may again be openly expressed, rather than  to  new
motives for conflict. In some of the African conflicts, too, the weakening of the state  - for
example in Somalia and Sierra Leone - has permitted conflicts to erupt and enlarge, which
might have been suppressed with a stronger state. In Kenya, in contrast, a relatively strong
state has kept violent conflict to a fairly small level (Klugman).  But, as noted earlier, the state
can also deliberately foster violence to undermine opposition groups, often provoking violent
reactions  by its actions. State violence was a key instigating cause in Uganda under both Obote
and Amin (see Stewart et al., 1997). In the studies here, the state has instigated violence by
attacking opposition groups in a number of cases, including Haiti, Rwanda and Burundi.
 
f. Opportunities: conflicts need resources, including arms, soldiers and food.  Some can be
seized from the local territory - more easily if the conflict is popular locally, which again
depends on whether the group involved regards itself as being seriously disadvantaged. 
Fighting groups can survive without outside resources, but the availability of support from
outside - credit, food, technical advice, and arms - clearly helps the resource situation and thusQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 17
’feeds’ the conflict. The Cold War conflicts were largely financed from outside: since the Cold
War, external support has continued to be important - from governments (outside and within
the region), from NGOs and from the private sector. External resources played a role in Central
America (still a Cold War event), in Afghanistan (from the US, Pakistan and Russia during the
Cold War era, and subsequently from Pakistan and NGOs); in Sierra Leone and the Congo
(mainly private sector). The genocide in Rwanda, however, was mostly self-financed, as has
been the persistent conflict in Somalia - showing that external resources are not essential.    
The same reality -  (a) above - i.e .the relative and absolute position of groups in political and
economic terms, may have different effects in terms of conflict-occurrence according to the
other dimensions, (b) to (f), just discussed. A poor ‘objective’ situation in terms of group
inequality may not translate itself into conflict if there is a strong state which suppresses it, or if
ideological elements are such that the inequalities are not widely perceived.   A new conflict
may emerge either if objective conditions change or if some of the other elements change - e.g.
the state weakens, new sources of external support for conflict develop, or leaders emerge who
powerfully and effectively communicate the actual inequalities to the members of the group.   
According to this view, the underlying reality about the absolute and, especially, the relative
position of the group is of paramount importance. This is because the other factors are all
permissive, but would not succeed in bringing about a conflict in the absence of these
inequalities. Section V will draw on the case studies to provide support for this conclusion. The
conclusion has important lessons for conflict prevention policies, which will be considered in
the last section. 
IV. Horizontal versus vertical inequality
The analysis of the causes of conflict presented above places overriding emphasis on inequality
among groups, along a number of dimensions. Yet this is not invariably associated with
conflict;  for example, high inequality has been present in Kenya, Thailand, Pakistan and Brazil
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may prevent the high inequality causing conflict, e.g. because absolute conditions improve, or a
strong state is able to suppress potential conflict. But it is also because of the way inequality is
assessed and measured - that is it is normally assessed in relation to the distribution of income
only and measured as vertical rather than horizontal inequality.
 In the analysis above, a matrix of 28  potentially relevant aspects of inequality were presented,
made up of four broad categories, consisting of   P (political), A (assets), Y
(incomes/employment) and S (social) dimensions. Each category consists of a vector of
different elements, i.e. P = Pi, Pii, Piii,... ; A= Ai, Aii,.. Etc. where Pi, Pii,..Ai, Aii are different
kinds of political participation and economic assets. Table 1 picked out seven in each category,
but is it possible to extend them and indeed to imagine additional categories that might be 
relevant in some societies.
Inequality in income distribution - economists’ normal space for measuring inequality - is  a
summary measure of the incomes/employment dimension but fails to capture, or gives only a
partial indicator of, the others. Moreover, income distribution is a vertical measure, i.e. it takes
everyone in society from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’ and measures their incomes and the consequent
inequality. What is needed for our analysis is a horizontal measure of inequality which measures
inequality between groups, where groups are defined by region/ethnicity/class/religion,
according to the most appropriate type of group identification in the particular society. 
It is possible to have sharp vertical inequality in any dimension without any horizontal
inequality - for example if the average income of all groups were the same and distribution
within each group was highly unequal (with the same inequality within each group). 
Conversely, it is possible to have considerable inter-group inequality, while overall societal
vertical inequality is small because intra-group inequality is small. However, there is necessarily
some connection between vertical and horizontal inequality since any overall measure of
societal inequality of income distribution (like the Gini or the Theil coefficients) (i.e. vertical
measures) can be decomposed into the weighted sum of two elements - inter-group inequalityQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 19
  For a decomposition of the Gini of this kind see Fei,  Ranis and Kuo; and for a decomposition of the
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Theil see Anand.
and intra-group inequality.  
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Like vertical inequality, there can be a number of alternative measures of horizontal inequality.
It is possible to use the same measures as for vertical inequality, where the population consists
of groups rather than individuals. These are more complex measures (especially as there are
usually only a few groups) than seems necessary. A simpler summary measure is the coefficient
of variation.  The ratio of the worst performing group to the average and to the best
performance are other useful measures.  From the perspective of causing resentment and
ultimately conflict, consistent relative deprivation over a number of dimensions may as relevant
as the actual coefficient of variation with respect to any one dimension.  This may be measured
by looking at rankings in performance on different dimensions (elements) and averaging them.
Persistence in the same horizontal inequalities over time is another relevant factor.  If gaps
between groups narrow or reverse this reduces their potential to cause conflict.
Conversely, widening gaps are more likely to provoke conflict.
Whether high levels of horizontal inequality are likely to cause serious conflict also depends on
the importance of the various groups. Where groups are very small, even if discriminated
against consistently, their potential to cause conflict on a substantial scale, i.e. enough to
constitute a CHE, is limited. 
In practice, data may not be available to measure horizontal inequality, since most concern to
date has been with vertical inequality (and even measures of this are often lacking). Moreover,
in politically tense societies, governments are not likely to want to publicise horizontal
inequalities. Nonetheless, it is important to collect such data, since it is essential for
identification of potential problems and possible solutions.  Measurement may be relatively easy
for some elements (e.g. some aspects of political participation); while for others rough
estimates may be made, or proxies used,  such as taking regional data to represent differences
among ethnicities, or distribution of land as a proxy for distribution of agricultural incomes. .
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fundamental difficulties. In conflicts, group differentiation is not based on some obvious
objective differences between people (e.g. all people over 6' tall versus all those below 6' in
height), but is constructed or created in order to mobilise people for political purposes, as
discussed earlier. Group construction is dynamic and fluid, changing with circumstances. In
some situations, group identification may nonetheless be obvious (e.g. where a conflict has
been ongoing for many years and the lines of differentiation are clearly drawn), but in others
groups may split or new groups may emerge in response to the developing situation. Then
identification of groups for the purpose of measuring horizontal inequality may not only be
difficult but may actually change the on-the-ground situation, either by reenforcing distinctions,
or by creating some perceived political advantages in new alliances and groupings. Moreover,
the announcement of the existence of a large degree of horizontal inequality may act as an
incentive to group mobilisation and violence.  It is clearly of the greatest importance that the
act of measurement, and the subsequent policies, should avoid worsening a conflict situation.
But to avoid any assessment of horizontal inequality altogether for these reasons would be to
lose an important tool for analysis of causes and prevention of conflict. My conclusion is that
measurement of horizontal inequality  and the uses to which it is put, should be conducted with
great sensitivity. 
V. Some evidence from the case studies 
The development of the general approach to analysing causes of conflict laid out in Section III
was greatly influenced by the case studies, from which some examples were drawn.  This
section uses the case studies, presented in schematic form in Table A (appended to the
chapter),  to provide some more systematic evidence on the role of the factors picked out in
Section III as being likely to lead to conflict.
Some of the major findings are:
1. Group categorisation: The categorisation of relevant groups differed across cases.  
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class conflicts. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge represented the impoverished peasants
and attacked the urban elite. In the case of El Salvador it was mainly a case of landed
interests versus peasants; this was also true of Nicaragua and Guatemala (not covered
here). In Haiti, the division was between the elite (largely dependent on the President
and state) and the masses (mainly peasants).
C Ethnicity was important as a differentiating element in Burundi, Rwanda, as the conflict
proceeded in Zimbabwe, and potentially in Kenya. Elements were present in
Afghanistan and also Cambodia, but not as the most important factor.
C Clans were the source of group differentiation in Somalia and Afghanistan.
C Warlords created groups (by force and financial incentives) in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
In Liberia, the distinction between the American-Liberian elite and local origin Africans
also played a small role.
This sample suggests that the popular image of modern civil  wars as being ethnically
motivated is only true in a minority of cases. 
2. Dimensions of inequality between groups: This too differed among the cases. 
Differential political access and control was virtually universal, but to a much lesser extent in
the two cases which have not developed into CHEs - Kenya and the Congo. In both these
cases, political patronage had been widely though unevenly shared, albeit some important
groups were left out. In all the other cases, political power and the benefits it confers were
monopolised by one group. In some countries this was the majority (the Hutu in Rwanda; the
Shona in Zimbabwe; the peasant class in Cambodia); on others, minorities, such as the Tutsi in
Burundi, the dictatorships in Central America, the various strongmen in Liberia and Sierra
Leone.
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state resources. In some countries, the President and a small coterie took a massive share for
their own private accumulation - e.g. the Duvaliers in Haiti; Mobutu in the Congo. In others, a
broader elite benefited - the elite Hutu in Rwanda, the Tutsi in Burundi, in Kenya the Kikuyu
disproportionately under Kenyatta and the Kalenjin and allied tribes under Moi. Half of
government investment in Burundi went to Bujumbura and its vicinity, from where the elite
Tutsi came. 
Unequal access to land was important in El Salvador and for some clans in Somalia but does
not seem to have been so relevant elsewhere. However, land pressure leading to rising land-
related conflicts is believed to have been an important factor in Rwanda, while competition for
use of land between cattleherding and pastoralists has occurred elsewhere (e.g. Kenya).
Education was an important element differentiating groups in Rwanda,  Burundi, Cambodia,
Kenya, El Salvador and Haiti.  In Burundi and Rwanda privileged access to education goes
back to Colonial times. In Burundi it has continued with deliberate attempts to limit access to
Hutu. Differential access to education both reflects differences in incomes and causes it, so it is
key to the perpetuation in inequalities, as recognised in Burundi, where educated Hutu were
targeted for killing in the 1970s.
Where minerals resources were in evidence, access to the revenues tended to be dominated by
whoever was in control, denying others access - e.g Sierra Leone, the Congo.  This greatly
increased the economic advantages to be secured by political control.
The matrix in table 1 provided a categorisation of potential elements that might differentiate
groups. Although there is not enough detailed evidence in many of the studies to permit a full
analysis of all the elements in the matrix, some broad conclusions emerge. There was
differentiation in almost all cases along the vector of political participation. In the vector of 
economic assets, land was the most important source of differentiation in Central America but
less so elsewhere, minerals in some African countries, and the reduction of communal
resources appears to have been a factor in Somalia. But this sample gives strong supports to
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conflict, although many people, often the majority, may be impoverished in a context of
environmental riches at a country level; the gross inequalities then become a source of conflict.
However, the worsening economic situation of the rural masses in Rwanda and Cambodia -
which had some environmental causes in both cases - undoubtedly contributed to the support
they gave to the genocidal activities. Biassed regional distribution of government infrastructure
was observed in Kenya (and also in Uganda) and featured in the Congo and Zimbabwe.  Water
did not turn out to be an important element in these cases. Swain’s review shows that this is a
near-universal finding. Water access has often been a cause of serious disputes, even violent
disputes on a relatively minor scale, but ultimately the disputes have normally been solved by
negotiation and not full scale war. However. Swain anticipates that water disputes may
increasingly cause violent conflicts as shortages become more acute.
In the dimension of employment and incomes, government employment, elite jobs and the
ability to earn rents were heavily biassed in favour of the group in power. The desire to
preserve these privileges was a clear motive for the frequent occurrence of state-sponsored
violence directed at suppressing opposition. Where the state was not strong enough to
suppress opposition but attempted to do so, violence from opposition groups was aimed at
securing state control so as to generate these privileges for themselves. However, although it is
evident that groups in power were able to enrich themselves, relatively and absolutely,
considerable within group inequality remained so that not all members of the ruling group
gained. This was notable among the Hutu in Rwanda where there was substantial
impoverishment, and one reason why the Hutu elite resorted to provoking ethnic animosities
was probably to prevent political expression of this economic impoverishment - which in turn
partly explained the massive response.  Sharp within group inequalities also occurred in Kenya,
especially among the Kikuyu,  making the elite among them less prone to violent opposition
since they had much to lose economically.  The Kikuyu elite were able to maintain much of
their economic privileges because they depended in part not on state but on private activities so
that control over the state was less essential to sustain high incomes. In countries where the
private sector is very small - which is true of many of the countries studied - control over the
state may present almost the only source of enrichment.  In the absence of an effective state,
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(Afghanistan) essentially duplicates state control and battling for control can become a source
of violent conflict.
Systematic evidence on the social access vector was rather thin in many of these studies. Biases
in the provision of education and government infrastructure (noted above) are indicative of
unequal provision. Evidence for Kenya and Uganda shows severe inequalities in social access
and social indicators.   Strong inequities are also shown dating from the colonial era in
Rwanda, Burundi and Cambodia. These were carried forward in the post-colonial era in
Burundi and until the Khmer revolution in Cambodia, while efforts were made to reverse them
with Hutu control in Rwanda and under the Khmer Rouge - in the latter case by minimal
education for all. In Haiti and El Salvador the peasants suffered from relatively (and absolutely)
poor access to health and education, with high unemployment rates in Haiti. High  rates of
poverty outside the elite governing group were to be seen in almost all cases.
3. Perceptions: as noted in Section III, it is not enough that groups are ‘objectively’ unequal.
Group identity, sufficient to bring about violence, requires strong perceptions of group identity
and of injustice in the group’s position. These perceptions are created historically and may be
enhanced by deliberate actions by potential leaders who want to use group mobilisation to
attain or retain power. Thus in Somalia “Militia leaders manipulated and used clan identities
and lineage alliances as an important resource which could be mobilised” (Auvinen and
Kivimäki, p3). In most cases, except in the most ‘privatised’ and commercial conflicts, leaders
took similar actions.
In both Burundi and Rwanda, the colonial powers had strongly differentiated between Tutsi
and Hutu, despite the fact that the people share language, religion, dress, diet, housing and
territory, treating Tutsi as superior. (The Tutsi were regarded as ‘natural aristocrats and the
Hutu as servile peasant folk’ Gaffney, p10) Thus historical perceptions of differences were
entrenched.  They were enhanced by new histories and propaganda. For Burundi, the Hutu in
exile developed a history of their country in which the Hutu claimed ‘rightful moral and
historical precedence over the Tutsi’(Malkki, 1995, p59, quoted in Gaffney p4) . In Rwanda,
“profoundly engrained, widely share images treat Hutu and Tutsi as radically and unchangeablyQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 25
  ‘Ethnic conflict and regional polarisation did not emerge or become salient in the 1970s and 1980s
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because of the stability and durability of the patronage system Mobutu institutionalised in Congo’ (Emizet, p
22).
different, in their history as well as in their characterial (sic), intellectual, social and moral
attributes....transmitted by a multitude of proverbs, stories and myths”, Uvin p18). Colonial
ethnic distinctions were also introduced in the Congo ‘inventing’ the Ngala and issuing ethnic
identity cards; but ethnic divisions were not enhanced under Mobutu who was able to retain
power through extensive use of patronage.    In Zimbabwe, the conflict was started as a
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political one, but  gained an ethnic dimension as the killings occurred.  In Somalia, a similar
type of discourse was used to promote clan solidarity,  emphasising the superiority of  
particular clans. “We are Darod - we are wealthy, religious and educated.. Whereas the mental
capacity of the Hawiye is limited..” (Quoted in Auvinen and Kivimkäki).
In contrast, ideology was used to promote group consciousness in El Salvador, Haiti and
Cambodia.  In both El Salvador and Haiti populist ideology was used by opposition leaders to
raise group consciousness and cement support. In Cambodia, revolutionary rhetoric concerning
the need for total revolution to end injustice and oppression was combined with strict party
discipline.
In other conflicts, alliances were short-lived and changing (Sierra Leone and Liberia) and deep
seated perceptions of group solidarity or superiority were absent. Groups were cemented
together by short-term interests - money, force and fear. Afghanistan is an intermediate case in
which religion and ideology (communism versus Islam),  ethnicity and clan solidarity played
some role, but financial self-interest and force were also present especially as the conflict
proceeded.
4. Private costs and benefits
For leaders the potential benefits from gaining power were huge, in states where there were
few checks and balances and rulers and their immediate allies could accumulate massive
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to wealth rather than wealth provided access to power” (quoted in Bakker and Le Billon, p
18). These gains were more attractive where there were few alternative opportunities - when
without power exclusion from state benefits was near total and the private sector was small and
undynamic.
The lesson that conflict was intended as means of private accumulation by leaders, with
ethnicity - or other cementing ideology - an instrument to gain support,  is repeated in many of
the studies.  Reno summarises this conclusion in his paper on Sierra Leone and Liberia - the
most venal of the conflicts: ”War is an intensification of competition for the resources of the
patronage system”(Reno p6). But the extent to which this applied varied across the cases. In
the class-based populist movements - El Salvador, Haiti, Cambodia - private accumulation was
undoubtedly a major motive of the pre-revolutionary governments seeking to retain power, but
not among  the populist leaders.   In many other cases,  the retention (or attaining ) of political
power was the prime objective,  the possibilities of personal enrichment this power permitted
providing strong motivation. In this type of dispute, ethnicity was used as an instrument (most
notably Rwanda and Burundi). In conflicts where the state had disintegrated,  there was a more
direct connection between force and enrichment as control of particular areas permitted
warlords access to the resources of the region without acquiring political power. 
Absence of attractive alternative sources of income increased the strength of the accumulation
motive. To the extent that there are other sources of wealth which would be threatened by war,
as in the private sector in Kenya, violence appears less appealing from a private cost benefit
perspective. In Cambodia, the lack of opportunities for the newly educated provided potential
leadership for the revolutionary movement.
The followers also benefited from some trickle down if their group achieved power. More
immediately, their role as soldiers offered an alternative to unemployment or very low income
earning opportunities, less for the pay (often non-existent) and more for the possibilities of
theft, looting etc. At a quite petty level, the economic gains that conflict can offer to young
men with few alternatives may be enough to make them wish to perpetuate the conflict as a
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not end the violence.  Force and fear are another motive for followers to carry out a war -
undoubtedly present in some cases, e.g. Cambodia.  
5. Constraints, resources and external action
A strong state can suppress potential violent opposition. However, in several of the cases, the
state was undermined by a combination of corruption and private profiteering, a deteriorating
economic situation, economic policy reforms which diminished the size of the state and the
success of opposing groups.  Radical weakening of the state occurred notably in Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Somalia. In such contexts,  quite small factions were unconstrained in their military
activities, whereas a strong state could prevent such violence erupting on any scale. On the
other hand, in many cases it was the state itself which was responsible for much of the
violence, a common situation as noted by Holsti. In such cases - like Cambodia, Zimbabwe,
and Haiti - the presence of a relatively  strong state does not prevent violence but even causes
it.
Resourcing these conflicts was not a problem: frequently, governments were receiving
generous aid and military assistance which sustained them and directly or indirectly financed
the conflict. The US financed the El Salvador conflict and supported Duvalier in Haiti for many
years. Substantial international aid supported Rwanda shortly before the genocide, Liberia
during the Cold War, and Somalia in the 1980s, as well as the two more peaceful cases, Kenya
and the Congo (both subject to intermittent and threatened violence - see Emizet and
Klugman).  Foreign resources of various kinds flowed into Afghanistan (from the USSR, from
the West, from Islamic states, from NGOs and from drug money) much of which went to
finance the war. Similarly, Cambodia has received substantial external support from the West
(which supported the Sihanouk regime and then Khmer Rouge in the 1980s), China and
Vietnam.
International support for peace has been less in total, and also less effective, than the war-
financing. UN intervention was on balance probably effective in peace-making in Cambodia
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without intervention, in the worst cases - Cambodia and Rwanda. Moreover,  the massive aid
flows to many of the countries in the pre-conflict years did nothing to prevent a conflict
situation and may have contributed to it. 
The contribution of aid to international conflict arose in two ways: first,  aid resources were a
major source of enrichment for rulers, and consequently high aid flows became a motive to
retain or secure political power; secondly,  the aid projects themselves did not contribute to
reducing horizontal inequality but often had the opposite effect, with the benefits being
strongly biassed in favour of particular groups (as in Rwanda). If the large aid flows had
succeeded in promoting broadly based development - as perhaps occurred in Kenya in the
1970s - they would have had a peace- promoting effect to counterbalance these conflict-prone
effects. But the aid failed to do so for this group of countries - which by its nature is a biassed
sample with a disproportionate representation of weak and corrupt  governments leading to aid
diversion, poor projects and generally weak economic performance.
IMF and World Bank conditionality is another source of international influence which is
sometimes thought likely to promote conflict because of its harsh effects on vulnerable groups.
For this set of cases, such conditionality was largely irrelevant as programmes were rarely
properly carried out since political events intervened. From an a priori perspective one would
expect IFI conditionality to have both positive and negative effects on conditions  making
countries vulnerable to conflict. On the positive side, removing discretionary power from
governments should reduce the strong private incentive to acquire power, since it should
reduce the opportunities for private enrichment. In addition, if the programmes succeed in
promoting a strong private sector, they would improve the economic opportunities outside the
government. On the negative side, reducing the size of the state reduces the gains from peace
and adherence to law and order . As access to social services, food subsidies etc. is reduced,
the social compact has less to offer.  In addition, the short term changes resulting from
economic policy reform can hurt particular groups in ways that may act as triggers to violence
if the underlying situation predisposes to it. Auvinen and Nafziger, however, find that IMF
programmes are negatively associated with CHEs (i.e. more likely in the absence of IMF
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violent situation are able to reach agreements with the IMF. In his careful review of these
issues, Morrison finds that while IMF programmes often lead to civil protests even involving
some deaths, they cannot be blamed for the massive conflict of CHEs. 
VI  Policy Conclusions
The analysis of the sources of conflict contained above has some strong implications for policy
formulation aimed at preventing, or ending, conflict.  Policy needs to address the underlying
causes systematically - other permissive elements (resources for conflict, for example) are
relevant too, but action on these aspects would not have lasting effects unless the root causes
are tackled. As a first priority, policy formulation needs to consider both the issues of
horizontal inequality among groups and that of the private incentives to leaders and followers.
The two sets of issues, the conditions of groups and the private incentives, overlap but are not
the same. 
Policy change is particularly difficult to achieve in the context of a country prone to violence,
perhaps currently experiencing it, and having a recent and longer history of violence. In this
context there are inherited memories and grievances, and entrenched group identity and inter-
group animosities. The government is rarely broad based and normally represents only a subset
of the groups potentially involved in conflict. It would often be naive to think that the
government even wants to promote peace, given the prevalence of state-instigated violence.
Hence the policies to be suggested below may fall on hostile ears as far as the government is
concerned.  The same may be true of the international community which has its own reasons
for pursuing the actions it has taken, which, too, have often been conflict-provoking. Hence the
context for introducing policy change must be recognised as structurally unfavourable.
Nonetheless, it is worth elucidating policies liable to reduce vulnerability to conflict since some
governments may wish to pursue them as would some international donors, at least judged by
their rhetoric; and for others, these policies can act as a standard against which actual policies
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Group (or horizontal)  inequality
The general direction of policy change must be to reduce group inequalities. To achieve this  it
essential to have inclusive government, politically, economically and socially. Inclusive
government politically means that all major groups in a society participate in political power,
the administration, the army and the police. Inclusive government economically implies that
horizontal inequality in economic aspects (assets, employment and incomes) is moderate; and
inclusive government socially that horizontal inequality in social participation and achieved
well-being is also moderate.  ‘Moderate’ is a loose term. Group equality would be the ideal.
Differences of more than two in average achievements between groups would normally
constitute severe inequality. The importance of any measure of inequality is increased if it
occurs systematically over a number of dimensions and grows over time. Hence such
consistency (or otherwise) and developments over time should be considerations in determining
what is an acceptable degree of horizontal inequality. Horizontal equity describes an acceptable
degree of horizontal inequality.  
The general objective of inclusivity and moderate horizontal inequality will translate differently
into specific policy recommendations in particular cases depending on the relevant groups in
the society, the dimensions of importance in the particular society and those in which there is
substantial horizontal inequality.
The most universal requirement is for political inclusivity because it is  monopolisation of
political power by one group or other that is normally responsible for many of the other
inequalities. Yet achieving political inclusivity is among the most changes to bring about. It is
not just a matter of democracy defined as rule with the support of the majority as majority rule
can be consistent with abuse of minorities, as was seen in the cases of Rwanda, Cambodia, and
Zimbabwe.  In a politically inclusive democratic system, particular types of proportional
representation are needed to ensure participation by all major groups in the elected bodies. For
inclusive government, representation of all such groups is also essential at the level of the
cabinet and other organs of government. For political inclusivity members of major groups also
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Since every case of conflict we have observed lacks such political inclusivity, this requirement
can be regarded as a universal prescription for conflict-prone societies. Such politically
inclusive policies have been adopted by well-known peace-making regimes, e.g. the post-
Pinochet Chilean government, Museveni in Uganda, South Africa under Mandela.
These political requirements for conflict-prone countries do not currently form part of the
dialogue of political conditionality adopted by some bilateral donors - as noted above, at times
the requirement of political inclusivity may even be inconsistent with the normal political
conditionality. At other times, it may be a matter of adding requirements tothe set of political
conditions. The usual political conditionality includes rule with the consent of the majority,
multiparty democracy and respect for human rights. Political conditions for avoiding conflict
would certainly include the requirement of respect for human rights. But the requirement for
majority rule is not a sufficient condition for conflict-avoidance, as noted above, while
multiparty democracy may not be consistent with conflict prevention since political parties are
often formed on ethnic (or other group) lines and can encourage group animosity (see Stewart
and O’Sullivan, forthcoming).
Some of the economic and social recommendations appropriate are likely to differ among
countries . Those concerning government expenditure and jobs, however,  are universal:
1.To ensure balance in group benefits from government expenditure and aid (including the
distribution of  investment,  and jobs).
2. To ensure balance in group access to education at all levels; health services; water and
sanitation; housing and consumer subsidies (if relevant). Equality of access in education is
particularly important since this contributes to equity in income earning potential.
The private sector can be an important source of group differentiation. It is a less explosive
source politically than an inequitable state sector as it is less directly under political control.
Nonetheless, in societies where the private sector forms  a major source of group inequality in
jobs, incomes and assets, this could be conducive to conflict and in such a situation it would be
necessary to follow policies to reduce the horizontal inequality present in the private sector.
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inequality stems from private sector activity. The particular policies to be followed to deal with
private sector sources of horizontal inequality differ across countries, but may include:
3. Land reform so as to ensure fair access to land by different groups. This policy would only
be relevant where differential access to land is an important aspect of horizontal inequality. In
our cases, El Salvador was a clear example.
4. Policies to ensure balanced participation in education and the acquisition of skills at all
levels. This has been an important and effective policy measure in Malaysia.
5. Policies to promote balanced access to industrial assets and employment. This is more
difficult to achieve than reform of public sector policies and need only be attempted where the
private sector is a major source of group inequality - which was not the case in most of the
countries studied here. Private sector firms may be required to have an equal opportunities
policy; they should be monitored and where horizontal inequality is high may be required to
provide a certain proportion of jobs at every level to members of the main groups. Similarly,
banks may be required to spread their lending across groups. Asset redistribution across groups
can be achieved by government purchase of assets and redistribution to disadvantaged groups.  
These sort of policies were introduced by the Malaysian government in its New Economic
Policy (NEP) which effectively narrowed the gap in incomes, employment and assets among
the major groups.
While the detailed policy requirements would differ according to the situation in a particular
country,  the important recommendation is the  general requirement to follow inclusive
policies, offsetting major elements of horizontal inequality.
Since, as noted, many governments are pursuing precisely the opposite policies, it is critically
important that such policies are built into the requirements of the international community in its
dealings with conflict-prone countries. In fact at present they are not - certainly not explicitly.
Aid allocation within a country depends on efficiency considerations and sometimes vertical
equity but not horizontal equity. Pursuing horizontal equity may sometimes conflict with
efficiency or even with vertical equity. These are  trade-offs that may have to be accepted. In
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is lost from any short-term output reduction that the new policy might involve. Mostly, there
would not be a significant trade-off with poverty reduction as balanced policies are also likely
to be poverty-reducing, while extending education to the deprived would be likely to
contribute to economic growth. Malaysia, for example, has been remarkably successful in
achieving economic growth and poverty reduction as well horizontal equity through the NEP.
IMF and World Bank policy conditionality is ‘blind’ to these issues, i.e. they take no account
of horizontal equity in their policy prescriptions (and also pay little attention to vertical
inequality), nor do they allow for the possible undermining of the state resulting from excessive
cutbacks following their recommendations. As lead institutions, it is essential that they
incorporate these considerations into their conditionality, not only with respect to project 
allocation but also in the policy conditionality applied to government economic interventions
and expenditures. This would require a quite marked change in their programmes for conflict-
prone countries.
Private incentives
The policies just sketched were all addressed to the need for inclusivity and group equity.
When applied to a situation not yet affected by conflict, these policies, if effective, might be
sufficient to eliminate the underlying causes of conflict, although an additional requirement is
that there is a sufficiently strong state to avoid violence erupting for private benefit in a near -
anarchical situation. If these conditions are met, then it may not be necessary to introduce
policies to tackle the private incentives to violence of leaders or followers. But when conflict is
ongoing, policies to tackle the root causes may need to be accompanied by policies to
encourage particular individuals involved to stop fighting and enter more peaceful occupations,
i..e. to change the private incentives.
The private incentives of leaders of major groups may best be turned round by offering them
positions in government. Lower level leaders may be offered jobs in the state army or civil
service, or  money.  This proposal may often fall on death ears, for political reasons - as with
other policy proposal suggested here, only governments seriously intending to end violence and
enhance national unity will follow the recommendation. Yet post-conflict governments haveQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 34
done so - for example, Museveni’s government (and army) incorporated many of those who
had been fighting against him; the first post-apartheid government in S.Africa likewise. Those
who had previously been active soldiers (the ‘followers’) need income-earning employment -
finance or jobs in works schemes can be offered in exchange for arms, or, where appropriate
land or agricultural credit. In some contexts the offer of a lump sum on demobilisation appears
to have been quite effective (e.g. after the Ugandan and Mozambique wars - see Collier; Dolan
and Schafer). Such policies can be expensive and need international support. Moreover, they
are difficult to apply in  less organised conflicts where large numbers move in and out of a
conflict,  and there is no clear demarcation between those who fought in the conflict and those
who did not.  Improving the income earning opportunities for the young generally, especially
for males, is needed in such contexts. To some extent this would happen by itself if peace were
restored, as farms can again be worked on, and other private sector activities may resume
(though some other war-related activities would cease). But in most cases there is likely to be
an interval when special employment schemes or financial handouts may be needed.
As with the earlier policies, what is appropriate inevitably differs among countries. The general
requirement is that these issues are explicitly considered when conflict is ending.
General development policies
Both general analysis and some of the econometric evidence suggests a connection between
predisposition to conflict and levels and growth of per capita incomes, although the correlation
is not strong (see Auvinen and Nafziger; Fitzgerald; Stewart et al). Economic growth would be
likely to reduce the propensity to conflict, if it is equitably distributed. Equitable and poverty
reducing growth would normally be likely to reduce horizontal inequality, and might make
persisting inequalities more tolerable. Hence policies that succeed in promoting such growth
should form part of any pro-peace policy package.  But it should be stressed that the growth
must be widely shared. Inequitably distributed growth can re-enforce horizontal inequality and
thus be conflict-promoting, as for example occurred in Rwanda.. 
A great deal of policy analysis has been devoted to delineating the conditions for widely shared
growth. Policies include measures to promote human development especially through theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 35
  Writing of ethnic conflict, he concluded: ‘When regional and social disparities in the distribution
11
of economic resources also reflect differences between identified ethnic groups, then conflicts over social and
economic issues readily turns into ethnic conflict’. Stavenhagen, 1996, p 294. But I believe this holds more
widely to any form of differentiation among groups - religious, class, clan - not merely ethnic.
spread of education; measures to increase savings and investment;  price and technology
policies to encourage labour-intensive technologies; new credit institutions to extend credit to
the low-income; measures to encourage the informal sector; land reform and support for small
farmers; international policies to improve market access and terms of trade and reduce debt
burdens. Many of these policies can be designed specifically to reduce horizontal inequality as
well as to promote growth and reduce poverty.  There is no question that a successful
development strategy of this kind would reduce conflict-propensity.  However, it is difficult to
envisage the success of such policies in countries with the major structural divisions which
bring about a CHE. Hence, while successful development would undoubtedly contribute to our
objective, it seems likely that the more specific policies discussed above concerning group
differentials and individual incentives will be needed not only for themselves but also as
preconditions for general development success. 
This section of the chapter has referred to conflict-prone countries as being the targets of the
preventative policies discussed above. This implies the need for some definition of ‘conflict-
proneness’. Conflict proneness may be identified by the following characteristics: (a) serious
past conflict at some time over the previous twenty years; (b) evidence of a considerable
degree of horizontal inequality; (c) low-incomes; and (d) economic stagnation. Condition (a)
by itself is a serious sign, expecially when one of the other three conditions is present. The
analysis above suggests that the presence of (b) together with  either (c) or (d) should be taken
as indicating conflict-proneness even if there is no history of conflict.  This is also the
conclusion of Stavenhagen.   The delineation of conflict-proneness is important because it
11
would be more effective to focus conflict-prevention policies on the subset of most vulnerable
countries, and also to channel aid and/or debt relief to these countries if necessary. Special care
should also be taken in conflict-prone countries to avoid providing resources (in the form of
aid or military assistance) which is likely to help finance conflict. This might seem an obvious
point, yet the case studies show that international resources have poured into countries on the
brink or in the process of conflict.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 36
Conclusion
The subject of this study is a large and evolving one, covering a huge range of countries and
situations. Obviously, one research programme cannot achieve definitive conclusions. The
findings of this chapter must in one sense be regarded as tentative.  Yet because of the ongoing
nature of these crises, it is important that action is taken on the basis of  current knowledge,
without waiting for further confirmation. It is in this spirit that the policy conclusions have been
presented above as a set of definitive recommendations. 
One conclusion stands out: in every CHE there is an interaction between factors, with group
perceptions and identity (normally historically formed), being enhanced by sharp group
differentiation in political participation, economic assets and income and social access and well-
being. Action on any one front alone is not likely to work - e.g. addressing economic
inequalities without political, or conversely; or attempting to ‘educate’ people to change their
views of their identity and their imaginary communities without changing the underlying
inequalities among groups.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 37
Appendix
Table A: The case studies summarised
Case Relevant groups Source of horizontal Perceptions Economic State role Resources Comment
inequality development prior to
conflict
El Salvador land lords Political; FMLN (leading healthy growth prior violent repression US  supported state As importance of
peasants land distribution violent opposition), to conflict, slowed with finance; business class
[landlords minority] highly unequal; communist inspired. down as tensions equipment increased and that of
communal property US characterised mounted. landed elite reduced
abolished 1882 conflict as ‘textbook there was pressure for
case of armed peace.
aggression by
communist powers’.
Haiti Elite surrounding Control over state Latin American Downward trend, Duvalier strong state International Similar to Central
President versus  resources among  liberation theology.. worsened by repressed all community supported America; privileged
others (mainly 19  C. Cliques; Populist movement, international opposition. Aristide Duvalier dictatorship; and corrupt elite
peasants; also black education; language; anti- dictatorial and sanctions, 1991-4. attacked corruption sanctions v. 1991 versus masses. 
middle class) land; econ. corrupt regime. and privilege,  military, and
th
opportunities. provoking military eventually UN
coup.  invasion to restore
democracy.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 38
Burundi Hutu;Tutsi;,  Political; distinction Hutu in exile moderate growth Tutsi dominate govt. Human rights Complex interactions
(and Twa - small and between farming developed new 1960s -1980s; State sponsored violations by state between Burundi and
irrelevant) (Hutu) and cattle history claiming Hutu stagnation 1990s in selective killing of ignored by Rwanda, on
[Tutsi minority]  rearing (Tutsi); ‘rightful moral and context of worsening Hutu, 1972; and international perceptions and fears
severe imbalances historical precedence’ international 1990s community - aid to





Rwanda  Hutu; Tutsi; Twa- v. Political; Ideology of Hutu Sustained growth in State sponsored Generous aid, High levels of
small Colonial era: sharp power : ‘Rwanda per capita incomes, violence against (among highest in poverty and illiteracy
[Tutsi minority]  inequalities favouring belongs to the Hutu, 1965-88 Tutsi, culminating in world) used in highly among Hutu.
Tutsi - in education, who were its true genocidal attack, discriminating way. Majority did not
employment, political inhabitants, but had 1995. Govt. praised for benefit from aid.
participation. Post- been subjugated development Govt. used violence
colonial Hutu gained brutally for centuries orientation and against Hutu as way
power. Privileged by ...the Tutsi (Uvin, appropriate objectives of maintaining
class of Tutsi p 14).  by World Bank support.
remained.  But all Ethnic images Report 1989..
policies - supported by
employment, aid proverbs, stories and
projects etc., army, myths from colonial
diplomatic service, times.
parliament reserved
for Hutu. Access of
Tutsi to higher
education and state
jobs limited by quota.
Ethnic IDs QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 39
Liberia Strongmen and Political; War essentially Economic decline State drastically Massive aid provided Struggle for control
factions; control over state commercial undermined as aid during Cold War over natural
Americo-Liberians; resources; operation; little fell and NGO share including arms. As resources - “war is an
locals natural resources ideology on any side rose; patronage aid was reduced, intensification of
reduced; could no support for particular competition for
longer maintain factions from resources of the
control international patronage systems”;
companies including ‘leaders’  sought
supplies for armies.  power to make
(resource based). money; for armed
Intervention by followers opportunity
Economic to use force to exploit
Community of West economic
African States opportunities
 
Sierra Leone Strongmen; Political; As Liberia Economic decline State undermined by Diminished state Neither ethnic, class,
factions control over state loss of control over revenue; turned to region or ideology -
resources; diamond revenue as private sources of war as a means of
natural resources taken by illicit finance and private private accumulative,
consortia; aid security firm supported by foreign
increasingly directed (Executive firms as they saw
to projects, not Outcomes); rebels their interests.
available for controlled some
patronage;  IMF natural resources
reforms reducing size
of state
Zimbabwe Political, geographic Political power Political overtly: state Moderate economic Majority democratic  Govt. resources Conflict aimed at
(Matabeleland) and ethnic argued that violent progress govt. led violence in abundantly funded by political opposition
rebellion threatened. order to suppress taxation etc. but became ethnic in
Labelled as ethnic by opposition practice. No strong
foreign observers. economic basis
Ethnic perceptions apparent
enhanced by conflictQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 40
Somalia Clans (key); Control over state Clan distinctions Economic stagnation State sponsored 1980s ODA v. high. Clans divisions used
Classes (state resources; emphasised for and decline 1980s violence under Barre Important source of by elites to fight to
dependent modern agriculturalists political ends. (E.g. and 1990s (1969-91); Barre state resources. control resources in
petite favoured relative to “We are Darod - we followed divide and Source of elite context of weak state. 
bourgeoisie/bureaucr pastoralists, are wealthy, religious rule policy among rivalry. US military Situation made worse
ats and ordinary Land - land reform and clans. support to Barre up to by generous aid
Somali); favoured modern educated..whereas the Post-Barre state 1989. resources. Use of
agriculturalists/ elites against mental capacity of power almost non- 1992 Operation traditional dispute
pastoralists. traditional the Hawiye is existent. Restore Hope resolution
agriculturalists. limited: they come achieved little.  mechanisms
from the bush” beginning to work.
(Kivimkaki, p13
from interview)
Kenya Ethnic groups Political; and Ethnic dimension not Economic growth, Some state sponsored International support Broad ethnic alliance
economic, social explicit in govt. fairly widely shared violence, not large for regime strong for of Moi, with
differentiation. statements or across ethnicities, scale. Fairly strong most of period. Some exceptions of Kikuyu.
Economically and opposition but voting 1960s - 80s. state repression of wavering in 1990s But Kikuyu benefited
socially favoured largely on ethnic Stagnation in 1990s. opposition with attacks on from market
group (Kikuyu),  not lines  corruption and economy. Danger
in Moi alliance; not democratic with economic
favoured for conditionality. stagnation 
investment or
patronage etc..QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 41
Congo Power-holder versus Ethnic divisions Little ideology Stagnation as rents Repressive state. International support Potentially conditions
others created by Colonial used to enrich ruling End-1989 security for Mobutu. Post seemed ripe for CHE,
state, but became less class apparatus employed Cold war withdrawn. but Mobutu  
important in post- 45,000. Mobutu state Kabila received patronage system
colonial era. Some instigated violence, support from operated with
regionalism, but but on relatively Uganda,  resource regional bias but not
‘ethnic conflict and small scale. hungry MNCs, and ethnic; and strong
regional polarisation subsequently  aid repressive state
did not emerge donors prevented emergence







Afghanistan Ideological Control over external Initially some Poor economy, but Weak state pre-1979. Resources supplied War not caused by
(Communism v. resources ideological element - stable, pre-conflict Destabilisation by USSR (up to ethnic divisions, but
Islam); Islam v. communism; through Soviet 1986); US, Pakistan. they were one
ethnic (Pashtun v. but increasingly invasion. Later unofficial flows consequence. Main
non-Pashtun); became Post 1986 (soviet from drug money; divisions ‘local
factional ethnic/factional; withdrawal) state Islamic support; solidarity groups’.
“the actors formed disintegrated MNCs for pipelines.  War acquired own
new alliances based Heavy role of NGO logic. What kept it
on ethnic and on humanitarian side.  going not same as
regional initial impetus.
considerations and Society transformed
purely opportunistical from largely self-
tactical criteria” supporting peasant
(Rubin, p 36). one to dependency on
Alliances shifting. international donors
and drug dealers.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 42
Cambodia Peasants; elite Location - Communist ideology Economic stagnation Weak state, 70-75, Resources for Khmer Political
(some overlapping urban/rural; of Khmer Rouge: from mid-1960s; state (and US) Rep. (70-75) mismanagement
ethnic dimension - Occupation - elite “‘total revolution’.. high inequality and violence against provided largely by (corruption/factionali
peasants Khmer and and salaried versus To redress injustice unemployment; even opposition (large US; aid and direct sm) combined with
some newly educated; peasants; and remove the many of urban elite casualties); military support; extreme
elite Sino-Khmer and education; causes of oppression” suffered. !975-79 Khmer Chinese support for impoverishment of
Vietnamese; also All associated with (Bakker and Le Rouge massive Khmer Rouge; peasants led to take-
Muslim Cham large differences in Billon p24) , killings of elite and Soviet and Vietnam over by murderous
targeted by Khmer incomes. including radical urban pop. support for left wing regime.





Rouge in civil war
that followed.
Iraq Chiefly Iraq nation not applicable Nationalistic rhetoric High growth until the State initiated Enormous human Internal opposition
versus world; plus of Hussein launch of attack violence against Iran, suffering caused by suppressed by strong
Kurds against Iran, 1980. Kuwait and Kurds. international state.
Negative sanctions
subsequently
Source: country studiesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS16 43
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